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March 4, 2006 
 
Auret van Heerden 
President and CEO 
Fair Labor Association 
27 Chemin des Crets-de-Pregny  
CH-1218 Grand-Saconnex  
Geneva, Switzerland 
 
Dear Auret: 
 
On February 17, the FLA circulated to universities a document expressing opposition to 
the central elements of the Designated Suppliers Program (DSP) and disputing several 
pieces of research either conducted or commissioned by the WRC.  The FLA document 
contains numerous inaccuracies, which appear to be based on the misreading of 
documents authored by the WRC, on misconceptions concerning the DSP, or on 
misinterpretations of domestic and international law.  In the interest of promoting a 
debate about the DSP that is constructive and firmly grounded in fact, I respectfully write 
to you for the purpose of correcting these errors.  
 
The FLA document, titled “Issues and Comments on the Designated Supplier Program 
Proposal,” includes assertions on six subjects.  This letter reviews these subjects in the 
following order.   
 
• Impact on Countries that Bar Independent Unions and the Issue of Job Loss in the 
Apparel Industry  
• ILO Principles and the DSP’s Provisions on Associational Rights  
• Living Wage 
• Antitrust Issues 
• The Selection of Designated Supplier Factories 
• Impact on Retail Prices 
 
Below you will find, for each of these issues, the text of the FLA document (in italics), 
followed by my comments – with the exception of the section on ILO principles, which is 
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discussed in an attached legal opinion letter by Professor Mark Barenberg of Columbia 
Law School. 
  
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Impact on Countries that Bar Independent Unions and the Issue of Job Loss in the 
Apparel Industry  
 
FLA Statement: The proposal requires that in order to be designated, a factory’s employees must 
be represented by a legitimate, representative labor union or other representative employee body.  
In countries like China and Vietnam, workers are not permitted to form labor unions of their own 
choosing.  Factories in these countries therefore might not be designated under the DSP.  In 
countries like Bangladesh, where unions are permitted, workers in export processing zones – 
where garment producers are likely to be located – do not have such right. Following the same 
logic, factories in export processing zones in Bangladesh might not be designated…[T] there are 
no readily available jobs in Bangladesh for workers who may lose their jobs in the apparel 
industry. 
 
The FLA is incorrect in suggesting that China, Vietnam, and the export processing zones 
of Bangladesh are ruled out of the DSP.  As the FLA acknowledges in the first sentence 
of the comment above, “the [DSP] requires that in order to be designated, a factory’s 
employees must be represented by a legitimate, representative labor union or other 
representative employee body” (emphasis added).  The language “other representative 
employee body” was specifically included in the DSP to make it possible for factories in 
countries like China to participate in the Program.  A variety of publicly available 
documents on the DSP, including USAS’ response to the FLA’s questions of November 
9, 2005, have explained this point.  It is surprising that the FLA is not aware of the DSP’s 
intent in this regard, given that it has been a matter of public record for months. 
 
China is, of course, the key issue here.  Chinese law effectively bars independent unions.  
However, Chinese law allows for worker committees to be formed that may be able to 
carry out many of the functions of a union, including collective bargaining.  NGOs and 
multi-stakeholder initiatives are engaged in a variety of efforts to help workers in some 
Chinese apparel factories create such committees – this is the most important code 
enforcement work now going on in China on the issue of associational rights.  The DSP 
will allow for factories with such committees to be designated suppliers, provided the 
committees are able to represent workers in a meaningful way through collective 
bargaining and other means.  Indeed, the DSP will actually create strong incentives for 
factories to work in good faith with such committees, as this will be the key to gaining 
designated supplier status – thus helping to advance real efforts in China to create space 
for workers to exercise their associational rights.  With respect to Vietnam (which has 
restrictions on associational rights similar to those in China) and the Bangladesh export 
processing zones (where recent legal reforms have made some improvements on this 
issue) the same standard will apply.  Factories with worker committees, or other bodies, 
that can carry out key collective functions (including bargaining) will be eligible to be 
designated suppliers.  We would expect the FLA to welcome a program that provides 
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incentives for factories in these locales to achieve meaningful compliance with the rights 
of association embodied in the FLA code. 
 
FLA Statement: As a result of the program, licensees are likely to end working relationships with 
many factories and leave workers without jobs.  This would seem to be contrary to the WRC’s 
long-held view that companies should stay with troubled factories and improve matters rather 
than “cut and run.”  
 
I appreciate the FLA’s acknowledgment of the WRC’s strong opposition to brands and 
licensees “cutting and running” from factories.  Unfortunately, what we have learned 
through five years of enforcing codes of conduct is that cutting and running is rampant in 
the industry – with licensees and other brands routinely leaving factories in search of 
lower prices, in order to concentrate production in one country as opposed to another, and 
for a variety of related reasons.  As a result, under the present sourcing practices of 
brands and licensees, job loss is endemic in the apparel industry – and is accelerating as a 
result of the phase-out of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement.  Workers have minimal job 
security; large-scale layoffs and factory closures are routine.  I know the FLA is aware of 
the widespread problem of job loss in the apparel industry, because it occurs regularly in 
the supply chains of leading FLA brands, as these brands shift production between 
factories and countries. 
 
One of the central purposes of the DSP is to do something about this epidemic of job loss 
and insecurity.  At present, university apparel is sourced from thousands of factories, with 
university licensees often representing only a minor and fleeting presence at a given 
facility.  The DSP envisions a much more stable system, in which university production 
is concentrated in a smaller number of factories where the licensees are the bulk of the 
customer base and where they stick around for the long term.  Under the DSP, workers 
would have far greater job security than they can find at present in factories producing for 
the collegiate market.  Given the concerns the FLA has expressed about the problem of 
job loss, I would hope the FLA would join us in supporting the kind of change in industry 
sourcing practices that we all know is essential if job security is going to be a reality for 
apparel workers. 
 
The FLA asks whether proponents of the DSP have an analysis of the impact of the 
proposal at factories that will lose collegiate production.  At the WRC, we have looked 
carefully at this question.  Our conclusion is that, because university licensees generally 
represent a very small portion of the customer base of a given factory, the impact on 
workers of the production shifts the DSP requires would be minimal.  There are also 
factories where a university licensee does account for a large portion of sales – but these 
are factories that will be prime candidates for designated supplier status, because they are 
factories the licensees have already identified as key suppliers.  Licensees will be able to 
nominate these factories as designated suppliers and then work with them to ensure that 
they achieve the applicable code standards, thereby maintaining – and indeed, increasing 
– orders in these facilities.   
 
In view of the widespread job loss and insecurity that plague apparel workers under 
current industry sourcing practices, the transition to the DSP, if it causes any job loss, 
  4
will be like turning on an electric fan in a hurricane.  Meanwhile, the lasting impact of the 
DSP will be to reduce job loss and achieve a far higher level of job security for the 
workers who sew collegiate apparel. 
 
 
ILO Principles and the DSP’s Provisions on Associational Rights  
 
This section of the FLA document asserts that the DSP provisions concerning freedom of 
association violate International Labor Organization (ILO) principles.  I have attached a 
legal opinion letter, prepared by Mark Barenberg, a Professor at Columbia Law School, 
an expert on national and international labor law, and the independent expert for the ILO 
in its recent study of corporate codes of conduct and monitoring.  We were very surprised 
by the FLA’s claims in this regard and we asked Professor Barenberg to review the issue, 
and the FLA’s arguments, and offer his opinion as to whether the freedom of association 
provisions of the DSP are or are not consistent with ILO principles and international and 
domestic law.  His conclusion, outlined in detail in the opinion letter, is that there is no 
conflict between the DSP and ILO principles and that, on the contrary, “the DSP would 
mark the fullest realization to date of rights of association by a private monitoring 
organization.”   
 
 
Living Wage 
 
FLA Statement: There are myriad technical and data problems in calculating the living wage 
even for one factory.  To do it adequately and defensibly on a “worksite-by-worksite” basis and 
on a monthly basis – as contemplated by the WRC proposal – would require a veritable army of 
staff.  We are not aware of the WRC’s experience in calculating living wages. 
 
• The proposal suggests that living wages would be calculated monthly for every location 
where a factory is located.  This is potentially a huge list of countries/areas, probably 
over 100 countries and many regions within each country. 
• The proposal suggests that prices would be collected monthly in each location—this 
suggests that the WRC would be doing the equivalent of the work that the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics does in the United States to calculate the U.S. Consumer Price Index 
around the world.   
• Commodities have different prices – even for commodities that appear to be 
homogeneous (like rice) the price will vary depending on quality, size of purchase, type 
of store where it is sold, etc. 
• The basket of commodities to be priced probably varies across regions. 
 
The FLA’s comments on the living wage issue misrepresent the mechanism through 
which wages will be determined under the DSP.  The FLA document also claims that 
there are insurmountable technical obstacles to determining a living wage, but fails to 
provide any persuasive evidence to support this claim. 
 
As the WRC notes in the introduction to our Sample Living Wage Estimates, apparel 
brands frequently justify their opposition to living wage on the grounds that the process 
of calculating a living wage is so irreducibly complex that implementation of such a 
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standard is impossible.  The FLA echoes these claims, asserting that there are “myriad 
technical and data problems in calculating the living wage.”  However, the FLA 
document identifies only four examples of this allegedly vast array of technical 
conundrums – two of which are premised upon a fallacious understanding of how the 
living wage element of the DSP will operate. 
 
Before addressing the FLA’s specific claims, it is useful to review how the living wage 
provision would be enforced under the DSP.  As the proposal outline states, “wages at 
each factory will be set through contract negotiations between worker representatives 
and management” (emphasis added).  The WRC will only conduct an assessment of wage 
levels at a particular factory if worker representatives make a complaint alleging that 
management has refused to negotiate a living wage.  In such cases the WRC will 
assemble a committee of experts from non-governmental organizations, academia, and 
other civil society institutions with relevant expertise.  The committee will make a 
determination as to the minimum salary required to meet basic living expenses in the 
locale in question and compare this to the highest wage offered by management during 
collective bargaining.  If the proposed wage is inadequate, the factory will be asked to 
renew negotiations with the factory’s union.  At the time of the DSP’s inception, the 
WRC will ask local experts in countries and regions where prospective DSP factories are 
located to conduct initial living wage research, in order to provide guidance to these 
factories.  This is the “worksite-by-worksite” research to which the FLA document refers.  
Once this initial research is complete, living wage calculations will be conducted only 
where disputes arise.   
 
The FLA claims that under the DSP, the WRC will re-calculate living wages every month 
at every factory where collegiate apparel is produced, stating that the DSP proposal 
“contemplates” and “suggests” this process of monthly calculation.  I do not know what 
language in the DSP proposal led the FLA to this strange conclusion, but the proposal 
does not call for a monthly recalculation of living wages and, to my knowledge, there is 
not a single individual associated with the DSP proposal who has ever suggested this.  
Again, aside from initial research, local experts would undertake a living wage 
calculation only in cases where a complaint arises that the management at a particular 
factory has refused to negotiate a living wage.  Wages will not be “calculated monthly for 
every location where a factory is located” and no army of staffers will be required. 
 
With respect to the other two “technical” problems posited in the FLA document, we 
agree that there are multiple factors that influence the price of a commodity, and we 
further agree that people in different regions eat different things and wear different 
clothes.  Indeed, I would venture to say that these realities are widely understood.  They 
do not, however, constitute serious impediments to the determination of living wage 
levels.  Through interviews with workers and consultation with local sources, researchers 
can readily determine the typical cost of an item of adequate quality, in local markets 
frequented by workers, in the quantity customarily purchased by workers.  This is exactly 
what the WRC did in preparing the sample living wage estimates to which the FLA 
document refers.  Researchers can also readily determine the composition of the market 
basket of goods and services that is culturally appropriate in a given region; indeed, we 
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emphasized the importance of this in the introduction to our living wage estimates.  This 
is why, when a complaint arises at a particular factory, the process of determining the 
living wage will involve a market basket definition specific to the region where the 
factory is located.  These two issues – the variation in prices for particular commodities 
and the variation in market basket composition – are fully taken into account in the 
WRC’s sample living wage estimates and will not be an obstacle to determining living 
wage levels under the DSP. 
 
FLA Statement: The DSP approach of a living wage calculated by the WRC fundamentally 
disempowers workers and the labor relations process.  We should be creating incentives and 
undertaking capacity building to encourage worker representation and collective bargaining to 
allow workers and employers to arrive at a wage level that reflects the domestic situation. 
 
National wage fixing machinery is usually tripartite and allows representation by all interested 
parties.  That improves the chances of them arriving at a realistic level.  The WRC as the arbiter 
of living wages would have none of the legitimizing features of a national mechanism mandated 
by law or established through collective bargaining. 
 
Under the DSP, wages will be negotiated in each factory between management and a 
union or employee body legitimately representative of workers.  The impact of the DSP’s 
living wage provision on these negotiations will be as follows: instead of the minimum 
wage being the floor upon which wage negotiations take place, the higher living wage 
standard will be the floor.  This in no way disempowers workers. 
 
The FLA code of conduct itself requires factories to pay the prevailing wage, a standard 
that is higher than the legal minimum wage.  If the imposition of a prevailing wage 
standard on factories does not “profoundly disempower” workers, by what logic does the 
FLA conclude that the living wage standard will cause such disempowerment?  Surely, 
the FLA is not claiming that mandating modest increases above the minimum wage is 
empowering to workers, but mandating substantial increases is disempowering.    
 
In reality, of course, the living wage standard in the DSP will profoundly empower 
workers and their representative organizations, by making it possible for them to 
negotiate wage levels substantially higher than could otherwise be achieved.  Experience 
teaches us that in order for collective bargaining to be effective, factories must have the 
financial wherewithal to agree to meaningful increases in wages.  At present, most 
factories do not – because of the intense price pressure from brands and licensees under 
which factories operate.  Thus, meaningful wage increases are frequently off the table 
before contract negotiations even begin – a situation which makes collective bargaining a 
hollow process and a source of false hope to workers that actually ends up undermining 
the ability of unions to maintain the confidence of their members.  The reason for the 
living wage requirement in the DSP, and for the requirement that licensees pay factories a 
price adequate to enable them to meet this standard, is to make it possible for unions to 
negotiate wage levels on behalf of their members that cannot be achieved under current 
market conditions.  
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I am unsure of the meaning of the FLA document’s reference to “realistic” wage levels.  
Is the FLA arguing that the wages currently earned by Third World apparel workers are 
adequate and do not need to be substantially raised?  If this is the FLA’s position, then we 
have a fundamental disagreement about economic reality.  If the FLA agrees that wages 
are too low, and is arguing that they should be higher but cannot be raised due to market 
realities, then this is exactly the problem the DSP is designed to solve – by altering the 
destructive market conditions under which factories operate and ensuring that factories 
receive prices from licensees sufficient for living wages to be paid.  
 
 
Antitrust Issues 
 
FLA Statement: The assumption underlying the antitrust legal advice memo is that products of 
licensors are not competitive, meaning that a buyer who seeks to buy a product with a particular 
university logo will not buy a product with another university’s logo no matter what the price 
difference.  This may not be a realistic assumption given the intense competition in the apparel 
market and the many different outlets that sell logoed products.   
 
Donald Baker’s conclusion that the DSP does not carry significant antitrust risk rests on a 
series of findings concerning the nature of the university logo apparel market.  The FLA 
asserts that Baker’s opinion rests entirely on one finding, and that this finding – that 
universities do not compete in their licensing function – is erroneous.  The FLA’s 
assertions are incorrect. 
 
1) Baker’s opinion rests on multiple findings, of which the finding the FLA cites is 
the least significant.  As a result, even if universities were found to be in 
competition with each other in their licensing function, Baker’s conclusion would 
not be affected. We would refer you back to the original Baker legal advice 
memo, in which Baker identifies the following findings as the basis of his 
opinion: 
 
• The motives behind the DSP are humanitarian, not economic. 
• The universities do not compete with the licensees or with the factories that might 
be excluded under the Program. 
• The universities do not stand to profit economically from a decision to participate 
in the Program. 
• The licensees did not play a significant role in initiating the Program. 
 
2) Baker stands by his finding that universities, from the perspective of antitrust law, 
do not compete in their licensing function. In response to questions from 
university administrators on the subject of competition, the WRC asked Baker to 
revisit this issue.  He has reported to us that this additional review only 
strengthens his conclusion.  The key point, as Baker explains, is the distinction 
between the licensing of a logo (which is controlled by universities) and the 
downstream sales of a product bearing that logo (which are generally controlled 
by licensees and merchants).  It is the former that is legally determinative, not the 
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latter.  Baker has provided us with an additional advice memo explaining this 
issue in greater detail.  I have attached this memo for the FLA’s information.   
 
As you know, Baker is a former Assistant Attorney General in charge of Antitrust for the 
U.S. Department of Justice and a leading authority on antitrust law.  As such, we have a 
great deal of faith in his analysis.  In taking issue with Baker’s conclusions, I presume the 
FLA is relying on the advice of a recognized expert in the antitrust field.  It would be 
helpful to know who this expert is – since his or her credentials would be helpful to us 
and our counsel in assessing the validity of the FLA’s assertions – and to know more 
about the evidentiary and analytic basis of this person’s findings. 
 
FLA Statement: There are certain areas that tend to increase antitrust concerns at the DOJ.  One 
of these is arrangements involving wages, particularly if the arrangements entail not merely 
payment of minimum, legally mandated wages, but rather some other wage level, such as a living 
wage. 
 
This statement is highly questionable in terms of the relevant law and the FLA’s own 
practice. Wage levels are not, in fact, an area of special concern for DOJ, nor for antitrust 
law generally.  Section 6 of the Clayton Act, passed in 1914, provides that “the labor of a 
human being is not a commodity or article of commerce,” and it was passed for the 
specific purpose of protecting collective activities (including collective bargaining) that 
are designed to enhance wage levels for employees.  
 
I am particularly surprised to see the FLA raise antitrust concerns about wage standards 
above the legal minimum, since the FLA code of conduct itself imposes a wage standard 
that goes beyond “merely payment of minimum, legally mandated wages.”  The FLA 
code requires payment of a “prevailing wage.”  Like living wage, prevailing wage is a 
higher standard than the legal minimum wage.  According to the logic of the FLA 
document, the FLA’s own Code of Conduct would be in violation of antitrust law.  
Baker’s review of the DSP concluded that the living wage provision – like the FLA’s 
prevailing wage provision – is not a particular antitrust concern.  
 
FLA Statement: The WRC has not obtained a Business Review Letter from the Department of 
Justice (DOJ) for the Designated Suppliers Program.  When the FLA was being formed, many of 
the member companies and universities took great comfort from the DOJ's Business Review 
Letter.   
 
The WRC is consulting with legal counsel, and affiliated universities, about whether it is 
necessary or advisable to seek a Business Review Letter from the Department of Justice.  
You suggest that the FLA’s decision to seek a Business Review Letter should be relevant 
to this discussion.  However, the FLA and the DSP are very different endeavors from an 
antitrust perspective. The contrast between the FLA and the DSP is striking and obvious. 
The DSP is an initiative of student activists and universities; commercial brand creators 
and licensees played no role in its initiation and will not formally play a role in the 
governance of the Program. The FLA is a collective initiative in whose initiation, design 
and promotion brands and licensees played a major role.  These corporations are often 
intense competitors, not only in creating products that are made in factories covered by 
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the FLA program, but also in the downstream marketing, distribution, and sale of these 
products to retailers and consumers. Moreover, these active commercial competitors play 
a powerful and formal role in the governance of the FLA.  For these reasons, the FLA is 
necessarily a far more sensitive collective endeavor from an antitrust perspective than a 
program initiated by students and universities for humanitarian reasons and without the 
expectation of commercial advantage.   
 
It is relevant to recall that, not surprisingly, it was the FLA’s member corporations, not 
its member universities, that pushed hard for a Business Review Letter – precisely out of 
concern regarding the corporations’ central role in FLA governance and their status as 
direct competitors in creating and marketing the branded apparel that is the focus of the 
FLA effort.  The corporate role in the FLA that gave rise to these concerns does not exist 
in the DSP.   
 
FLA Statement: Should the DSP go forward and litigation result in a finding of antitrust 
violation, this could have serious implications for universities and for their licensing programs, 
particularly because of the treble damages associated with antitrust violations.   
 
It would indeed be a serious problem if universities lost antitrust suits arising from their 
participation in the DSP – just as it would be a serious problem if universities lost 
antitrust suits arising from their participation in the FLA (or in the WRC, for that matter).  
I think it is fair to say that there is no disagreement on this point.  The issue, however, is 
not whether it would be bad if such a suit were successful. The question is whether there 
is any likelihood that such a suit would be successful.  The WRC has sought the advice of 
an attorney who is a leading authority on antitrust law and the former head of the 
Antitrust Division at the Justice Department.  He has concluded, based on extensive 
analysis, that the answer is no.  The FLA questions Baker’s conclusion, but the only 
argument you make is one based on a misreading of his opinion.  Beyond that, it is not 
clear what the FLA’s reasons are for questioning his conclusions, nor is it clear on whose 
legal expertise the FLA is relying. 
 
 
The Selection of Designated Supplier Factories 
 
FLA Statement: Are there enough factories to provide the product differentiation needed to 
sustain licensing revenues? Since the entire collegiate-licensing business is a small fraction of the 
apparel industry, will the higher-quality factories, with many customers beside licensees, simply 
opt out of manufacturing for licensees imposing these requirements? 
 
There has been very limited or no engagement to date of the licensee community in the 
development of the DSP.  Licensees would be in the best position to be able to determine how the 
proposal would affect their activities in terms of identifying sufficient factories to serve all of 
their needs.  To our knowledge, the WRC has not carried out this analysis.   
 
The concern that there will not be enough factories to serve licensees’ needs under the 
DSP arises from a misunderstanding of the means through which factories will become 
designated suppliers.  Again, it is important to understand that the purpose of the DSP is 
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not to effect a wholesale shift of university production to some pre-existing set of 
factories that are already fully-qualified for designated supplier status.   Under the DSP, 
licensees will have the option of choosing from among factories that have been identified 
by the WRC as possessing the capacity to achieve designated supplier status, based upon 
the factories’ overall level of code compliance.  However, as explained clearly in the DSP 
proposal document, licensees will also have the option of bringing any of their existing 
suppliers into the system by helping those suppliers to meet the qualifications for 
designated supplier status.  Indeed, by requiring licensees to purchase from factories 
where there is legitimate worker representation, where workers can negotiate a living 
wage, and where all other university standards are met, the DSP will give licensees a 
powerful incentive to bring factories already in their supply chains up to these standards.  
Some factories not now producing university logo apparel will become designated 
suppliers, but, because we assume many licensees will prefer to stay with existing 
suppliers, we expect that many designated suppliers will come from existing licensee 
supply chains.  Since licensees will be able to nominate designated suppliers from among 
their current supplier factories, it is hard to understand why they would be concerned 
that there would not be sufficient production capacity.   
 
The FLA also suggests that factories will not be willing to participate in the program.  I 
do not know the FLA’s reasons for believing that factories will not want to be part of the 
DSP, but this is not what we have heard in our consultations with suppliers.  Instead, we 
have heard repeatedly from factories, including some who have been suppliers to top 
university licensees, that they would enthusiastically welcome the opportunity to have 
access to steady orders at fair prices and would be willing to accept the labor rights 
obligations that would be required.  Given the enormous volatility of orders and the 
corrosive price pressures that pervade the industry, this is no surprise.  Indeed, for most 
apparel suppliers, participation in a program that offers stability of orders and a fair 
match between prices and production costs is a no-brainer.  This is not because factory 
owners are necessarily deep believers in worker rights principles.  It is because a system 
that rewards labor rights compliance by providing better prices and more stable orders is 
a vastly better deal for factories than the current system, in which suppliers are told to 
make costly improvements in labor practices even as licensees and other brands continue 
to squeeze them mercilessly on price. The requirement that designated suppliers produce 
primarily for the collegiate market will also not be a deterrent to participation, as two 
factory operators, who are also leaders of their respective countries’ export associations, 
explained to the WRC University Caucus meeting on February 17.  Apparel suppliers 
want one thing: steady orders at good prices.  Finding high-quality suppliers willing to 
participate in the DSP will be among the easiest aspects of the program’s implementation.   
 
FLA Statement: An open question is whether, when faced with the DSP, some of the licensees for 
whom collegiate products are not central, will decide to terminate licensed production and will 
move into other forms of production, to the financial detriment of universities.  
 
It is indeed a question whether some licensees will accept the DSP, since it asks licensees 
to do substantially more than they are doing at present to ensure respect for worker rights.  
However, it is important to understand that this is the same question universities faced 
when they first adopted codes of conduct and first required licensees to publicly disclose 
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factory locations.  Licensees strongly opposed those steps, making many of the same 
arguments that licensees and the FLA are now making against the DSP.  And licensees 
underlined their arguments with the same veiled (and sometimes not so veiled) threats to 
leave the university market.  To their enduring credit, universities went forward anyway.   
 
 
Impact on Retail Prices 
 
FLA Statement: The DSP is quite candid in stating that consumers will pay for the cost increase.  
The WRC document titled “The Impact of Substantial Labor Cost Increases on Apparel Retail 
Prices” states that the impact of increasing wages to living wage levels would result in 
“relatively small increases in retail prices.”  However, the legal opinion by Baker for the WRC 
states that the DSP would result in price increases paid by licensee factories on the order of 10-
12%.  This may be the “relatively small increase in prices” that the WRC refers to in its paper.  
We are not aware of analysis that would show how an increase in the price of logoed goods of 
10-12%, while presumably prices of other competitive products remain the same, would affect 
sales of logoed goods. 
 
The 10-12% figure cited by the FLA is not the WRC’s estimate of retail price increases.  
The WRC paper to which the FLA refers is very clear on this point.  It states the 
following: “For a typical sportswear garment, doubling wages would result in retail price 
increases of roughly 1-3%; tripling wages would result in price increases of 2-6%.  In 
most cases the resulting price increases will be at the lower bound of these ranges.  These 
estimates assume that all of the increase is passed along to consumers; if some of the 
costs are absorbed by licensees, retail price increases would, of course, be 
commensurately smaller.”  
 
These are the “relatively small increases in retail prices” to which we refer.  These words 
appear in the same WRC paper that the FLA cites and they begin exactly four sentences 
after the language the FLA quotes.  I therefore confess to being confused as to how the 
FLA can have failed to take note of these figures.  It is also unclear why the FLA, having 
ignored the retail price increase estimates of 1-3% and 2-6% that are explicitly referenced 
in the WRC paper, instead plucked a figure from an unrelated document that is not a 
reference to retail prices at all, but rather a reference to factory prices, and posited that 
this far higher number, 10-12%, “may be” the WRC’s estimate of retail price increases.   
 
If the FLA and its member brands believe the WRC’s estimates of retail price increases 
are inaccurate, we welcome your critique and the evidence you have to support it.  We 
will be glad to respond.  However, whether or not the FLA agrees with our estimates, I 
would humbly request that if you are going to cite our estimates, you ensure that these 
citations are accurate.   
 
In addition, the first sentence of the FLA statement on this issue misstates the WRC’s 
position concerning the share of the increase in labor costs that will be borne by 
consumers.  We do believe that some of the increase in labor costs under the DSP will be 
passed along to consumers, but we also stress that some of the costs may be absorbed by 
licensees, resulting in smaller retail price increases – a point made repeatedly in our 
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paper.  The retail price estimates in our document are estimates of what will happen if all 
of the increase is passed along to consumers.  The paper does not state, as the FLA 
claims, that all of the increase will be passed along to consumers.  Indeed, the most likely 
scenario is that a part of the cost increase will be passed along to consumers and part 
absorbed by licensees and/or retailers, resulting in price increases significantly smaller 
than those estimated in the WRC document.   Moreover, there is another factor that may 
significantly reduce the impact of the DSP on retail prices: the incentive the DSP’s 
pricing requirement will give licensees to work with their factories to reduce costs by 
improving efficiency.  As the DSP proposal explains, the licensees’ obligation under the 
DSP is to pay suppliers a price adequate to cover the cost of producing in compliance 
with universities’ labor rights standards.  “To the extent that a supplier derives cost 
savings” through licensee-supported efforts to improve efficiency, “the price premium 
required to…achieve the workplace standards will be reduced.”   
 
------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
I hope you find the information in this letter useful and that it will serve to correct both 
the factual errors that appear in the FLA document and the broader misconceptions that 
underlie them.  Please feel free to contact me if you would like to discuss any of these 
issues in greater depth. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Scott Nova 
 
